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 Sexual minorities have historically been subject to many kinds of discrimination. 
Prejudicial treatment in the labor market could arguably be one of them. Despite that, economic 
literature has remained mostly silent on the topic. This paper fills that void by leveraging on a 
novel longitudinal data set that collects detailed information on sexual orientation. I develop an 
empirical strategy that exploits the fact that sexuality is not a dichotomous trait but rather a wide 
assortment of sexual preferences. I use empirical models that rely on the identification of 
unobserved heterogeneity, in the forms of skills and sexual orientation, to allow schooling, 
employment, and income to be endogenously determined. I find that, after controlling for 
differences in skills distributions, there are no income gaps against employed homosexuals. 
However, consistent with the existence of discrimination, homosexuals are 10–20 percentage 
points less likely to be employed than heterosexuals. These gaps cannot be explained by 
differences in observable characteristics or skills and are larger among men and the college 
educated. The results suggest that selection on the employment margin contributes to the 
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1 Introduction
Ever since Becker (1957), labor market discrimination has been a popular topic in economics.1 In
particular, labor economists have devoted substantial effort in analyzing labor market discrimina-
tion against women and racial minorities.2 Some of their findings contributed to the implemen-
tation of a number of antidiscriminatory policies around the world. However, much less is known
regarding labor market discrimination toward sexual minorities, despite the progress made by this
population in securing social rights in recent years (Mucciaroni, 2009; Frank, 2014). Some litera-
ture has documented the existence of a sexual minority wage gap. In particular, this literature has
shown that homosexual men earn less than their heterosexual counterparts by about 15–30 percent
(Badgett, 1995; Black et al., 2003; Carpenter, 2007). Evidence on women is less conclusive. Some
studies suggest gay/bisexual women earn less than heterosexual women (Badgett, 1995); others
argue the opposite (Berg and Lien, 2002; Black et al., 2003, 2007; Antecol et al., 2007).
Although these studies have made important contributions to our understanding of sexual mi-
norities’ labor market outcomes, there are at least two major problems with the existing literature.
First, they do not consider that schooling and occupational choices are endogenous and themselves
possibly affected by the sexual preferences as well.3 And second, the income gap might respond to
1Defining labor market discrimination is not a simple matter. In this paper, I take a broad view of discrimination
defining it in terms of members of the minority group (i.e., the group that suffers discrimination) being subject to
inequitable treatment that may lead to disparate outcomes (Cain, 1986).
2See, for example, Cain (1986) survey article that collected the extensive evidence available by then on racial and
gender labor market discrimination; Mincer and Polachek (1974) link between the family decisions on differential
human capital investments across genders and earnings’ gap observed later in life, which relates to Neal and Johnson
(1996) findings where they account for most of the black-white wage gap by differences in cognitive skills; more
recently, Urzua (2008) introduces differentials in abilities rather than test scores as partial determinants of the
black-white wage gap, and Lang and Lehmann (2012) who review the existing literature on racial discrimination
and evaluate the capacity different theoretical models have to explain the empirical regularities of discrimination
we observe today; finally, see Blau and Kahn (2017) for a recent review of the current state of the literature on the
gender wage gap, where they suggest that human capital factors are no longer able to explain it.
3Evidence suggest that college outcomes are in general different for homosexual men (Carpenter, 2009); that
cohabiting homosexuals have significantly higher levels of education than heterosexuals (Allegretto and Arthur,
2001; Antecol et al., 2007); that gay cohabiting men supply less labor than married heterosexual men, while
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unobservables, namely skill differentials, not only in productivity terms but also in the way people
choose their schooling level or occupation. This paper overcomes these two issues by using an
empirical strategy that controls for unobserved heterogeneity, and based on them allows choices
and labor market outcomes to be endogenous.
Another problem that plagues this literature is the lack of appropriate data sets. Papers on
sexual-preference discrimination have relied mainly on two sources of data: the General Social
Survey (GSS) or the census.4 Each has its own problems. On one hand, the GSS provides a
relatively detailed description of sexual preferences but has an extremely small sample size that
hinders empirical work on the topic. On the other hand, the census provides a larger sample
size, but the definition of who belongs to a sexual minority has important setbacks. Researchers
using the census identify homosexuals from people who cohabit with a person of the same gender
Clain and Leppel (see, for instance, 2001); Allegretto and Arthur (see, for instance, 2001); Antecol
et al. (see, for instance, 2007); Antecol and Steinberger (see, for instance, 2013). Therefore, those
identified comprise a selected sample that excludes people who have chosen to remain single (Black
et al., 2007). The cultural and legal restrictions imposed to gay marriage give the grounds to claim
that the selection into marrying/cohabiting is very different for homosexuals than for heterosexuals,
and that it may rely heavily on unobservables that also affect the schooling and occupational choices
and the wages earned.5 I overcome these problems by using a novel longitudinal Norwegian data set
that provides very detailed information about sexual preferences, allows me to have an acceptable
lesbians supply more labor than heterosexual women (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2006)
4See Black et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the data sets that contain data on sexual preferences in
the United States. Carpenter (2007) uses the National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys but faces the
same problems I describe for the papers that use the GSS. Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) use the Current Population
Survey. These data face issues analogous to the ones I describe for the papers that use the census.
5Antecol and Steinberger (2013) show that the gap between primary and secondary earners within a household
of cohabiting lesbians is smaller than than found in a heterosexual household. This could relate to differences in
selection into marrying/cohabiting across sexual orientation, and thus, be one of the many vehicles through which
limiting the sample to partnered adults may be biasing the labor maket outcome estimates.
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sample size, and importantly, allows me to measure skills as a latent variable. This way, I do
not have to restrict the study to nonsingle homosexuals, and I am able to avoid the source of
confoundedness that arise from such a selected sample.
An additional contribution of this paper is that it considers homosexuality a continuous la-
tent variable. This novel approach goes in line with the fact that, widely accepted in psychol-
ogy, sexuality is not a dichotomous trait but rather a complex assortment of sexual preferences
(Laumann et al., 1994). The treatment of homosexuality as an unobserved—to the econometri-
cian—continuous variable provides an opportunity to better understand the effect that different
degrees of homosexuality can have on the labor force.
Furthermore, I extend the model of potential outcomes with unobserved heterogeneity used in
Heckman et al. (2006) and Urzua (2008) to incorporate the endogenous choice of employment, and
thus address selection issues that could affect the estimation of an income gap—namely, that the
absence of an income gap does not rule out the existence of discrimination. In fact, it could be
the results of discrimination at hiring (Brown, 1984). Income gaps may not be evident within the
employed population because only the highly skilled within the minority will manage to get a job.
Therefore, quantifying the effect of an entrance barrier to the labor market for sexual minorities
becomes particularly relevant.
Gaps against sexual minorities in the probability of being employed could materialize through
both the demand and the supply sides of the labor market. Regarding the former, one can extend
the Beckerian model of discrimination to include the fact that if the compensation—the gap be-
tween the wages the employer is willing to pay majority workers over minority ones—needed by
the employer to outweigh her distaste for minority workers is big enough, it could cause the wage
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offered to minorities to be less than their reservation wage.6 The latter may be driven by the fact
that sexual minorities often have to face hostile workplace cultures (Frank, 2014), and thus, their
reservation wages may be higher in order to compensate for that inconvenience when taking on
a job.7 Although both channels differ profoundly, they amount to discrimination as they cause
minority agents to behave differently in the labor market, obtaining different outcomes from it.
I find evidence on the existence of labor market discrimination against sexual minorities. My
results indicate that discrimination exists at the employment margin and not at the earnings margin
for those employed. The overall employment rate is between 10 and 20 percentage points lower
for homosexuals than for heterosexuals. I find that this type of discrimination is stronger among
men than women. This endogenous selection into employment reduces the income gaps we observe
among the employed. Discrimination causes employed homosexuals to be, on average, more skilled
than the average employed heterosexual, and the former face extremely high labor market returns
to those skills.8 Hence, the distributions of skills matter. I find that—although their means are
not different from each other—the variance of the skills distribution of heterosexuals is greater
than that of sexual minorities. Then, if skills of the latter were drawn from a distribution like
the one of heterosexuals, the observed income gaps—which range between 9.45 percent and 12
percent—disappear. This happens because a wider skills distribution will increase the fraction of
people that surpass the hurdle of becoming employed and face substantially greater returns to those
6This intuition on the effect of discrimination on employment is general enough to include specific mechanisms
explored recently in the literature like uncertainty in the subjective evaluation of minority workers by majority
managers (Ritter and Taylor, 2011).
7This angle relates to the one explored by Bond and Lehmann (2018) where black workers lower their reservation
wage when they are matched with firms that have black supervisors, as it signals lower firm’s prejudice. Black
workers are willing to work for less in these firms in order to secure a less prejudiced environment that would yield
lower probabilities of being fired.
8This challenges the argument of Cain (1986) that states that there should not be employment rate gaps against
minorities without the existence of earning gaps, because if minorities are consistently rejected and not hired, they
must bid for lower paying jobs.
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abilities. Finally, I find that discrimination against sexual minorities differs across g enders. Among 
homosexual men, the college educated ones are less likely to find a job. Among homosexual women, 
those with no college degree are the ones who are less likely to find a job. Also, while employed 
homosexual men face no wage penalty, employed homosexual women do. In particular, given 
that the tougher selection occurred on the non-college-educated, employed college-educated 
nonheterosexual women who get a job earn 10 percent less that heterosexual women.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the definitions of homosexuality used in
the paper and presents evidence on the income gap. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 intro-
duces the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the first set of results and discusses whether the
differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals in terms of income, schooling choices and oc-
cupational choices respond to differences in skills. Section 6 presents the analysis of homosexuality
as a latent factor. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Definition of Homosexuality According to the Data
Defining homosexuality is a difficult task, regardless of the data available. Homosexuality is not
a dichotomous indicator but a spectrum of preferences that go from being attracted or having
had sex with only women to being attracted or having had sex with only men, with a complex
assortment of sexual preferences in between these two extremes (Laumann et al., 1994).9 Defining
homosexuality according to the data becomes even more complex as it can be drawn from three
9That is why in this paper I sometimes use the term “nonheterosexual” to refer to people whose sexual preferences
are away from the heterosexual extreme but anywhere else in the spectrum of preferences.
6
different concepts (Laumann et al., 1994; Badgett, 1995) . First, the extent to which each gender
generates sexual interest (i.e., sexually attracted to, sexual fantasies about) to the respondent.
Second, whether the respondent considers herself homosexual to a particular extent. And third,
the gender of the respondent’s sexual partners. It should be noted that one definition does not
imply any of the other two, particularly for individuals of the homosexual or heterosexual extremes.
The data set I use (fully described in Section 3) inquires about the respondents’ homosexuality
under the three different definitions, and it does so by using a rich set of possible categories to
fully capture the wide range of sexual preferences under each definition. The fact that sexuality is
not a dichotomous trait but a continuum of degrees of preferences that can be manifested in three
dimensions implies that discretizing those measures requires the imposition of ad hoc thresholds,
one for each definition. One way to use the data is to build three dichotomous variables that split
the sample between heterosexual and non-heterosexual respondents. One can construct the first
measure according to sexual interests (SI) and considers to be homosexual any individual who
is attracted in any degree to people of the same sex. A second measure could be constructed
according to self-perception of homosexuality (SP) and considers as homosexual any individual
who believes she is homosexual in any degree. Finally, a third measure (SX) responds to whether
a person has had sex with someone from the same gender. Note that in the interest of sample size,
in creating SI, SP and SX, I imposed the thresholds so as to define as homosexual anyone that
claims to be nonheterosexual in any degree.
The left panel in Figure 1 shows the proportion of respondents who are classified as homosexual
according to each definition. It shows that the SI and SP definitions are, as expected, very similar
to each other, while the definition that relies on actual sexual relations is much more selective.
Interestingly, for every definition women are more likely to be classified as homosexuals, but the
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difference in the number of men and women identified as homosexual is drastically smaller in the
SX definition than in the ones that use self-perception or sexual interest.
Often, individuals classified as homosexuals according to one of the definitions are not classified
as such according to other one. Figure 1 presents a Venn’s diagram of homosexuality according to
each definition. Around two thirds of the sample are considered heterosexual, and only 6.6 percent
are considered homosexual according to all three definitions of homosexuality.
Discretizing the measures of sexual preferences is arbitrary and results in some loss of infor-
mation. To overcome this issue, this paper also incorporates the treatment of homosexuality as
a continuous latent variable that can be measured through three manifest scores. Thus, I allow
people’s degree of homosexuality to be an unobserved continuum that affects the answers given to
each question regarding sexual preferences. That way, I can reconcile the fact that people may be
less heterosexual according to one score but more heterosexual according to other. That is because
the latent degree of homosexuality could, for instance, be enough to be manifested in one score, but
not in others. This approach, explored in Section 6, also allows the scores to be affected by family
contexts that could influence the likelihood of someone manifesting a degree of nonheterosexuality.
2.2 The Income Gap
The typical estimation found in the literature on income discrimination for sexual minorities relies
on a linear model for labor market outcomes of the form
lnY = α + γGay + βX +
S∑
s=1
φsDs + ε (1)
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where Y is the income measure of interest, X is a set of observable controls (e.g., age, experi-
ence, geographical region), and Ds is a dummy variable that represents the schooling level where
s = {0, . . . , S}.10 To capture differences between the effect for lesbians from the effect of homo-
sexual men, Equation (1) is often augmented with an interaction between Gay and gender, or
the estimations are done separately for each gender. In essence, the parameter of interest of these
types of models is γ, which the existing literature interprets as the difference in income between two
individuals that have the same observable characteristics and have achieved the same education
levels but differ in their sexual preferences.
However, the estimation of (1) requires substantial econometric considerations. The most
important one is that unobservable characteristics may influence simultaneously schooling or oc-
cupational decisions and income, and those choices themselves can be influenced by the sexual
preference of the individual. Models like (1) also assume that φs does not differ across sexual
preferences. Although, we are not interested in the estimates of φs, this assumption does affect
the estimate of γ due to the endogeneity issues just described.
For comparison purposes, Table 1 presents the reduced form results of models of the type de-
scribed by Equation (1) for each definition of homosexuality. Column 1 presents the unconditional
difference in means. Norwegian homosexuals, on average, earn between 11 and 15 percent less
than heterosexuals. Adding age and gender controls in Model 2 reduces this gap by about a third.
However, the specification that most resembles the one used in the existing literature is that of
Model 3 with the introduction of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent
had any kind of tertiary education. Also, it incorporates an interaction term between gay and
10Berg and Lien (2002) use a multinomial logit because the income on the GSS data is coded in ranges. The
intuition and controls used remain the same as in (1)
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Table 1: Gap in Yearly Income
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Definition Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
SI -0.139*** (0.045) -0.104** (0.045) -0.166* (0.086) -0.149* (0.090)
SI×female 0.089 (0.101) 0.075 (0.105)
SP -0.157*** (0.046) -0.107** (0.046) -0.146* (0.081) -0.138 (0.085)
SP×female 0.056 (0.098) 0.072 (0.103)
SX -0.113** (0.057) -0.089 (0.056) -0.058 (0.086) -0.064 (0.090)
SX×female -0.055 (0.113) -0.020 (0.116)
Age & gender X X X
College X
Test scores X
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations were drawn from different regressions with the dependent variable being the
natural logarithm of yearly income among the employed population in wave four of the survey. Age enters in a quadratic polynomial.
The College variable takes the value of 1 when the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole) or
universities (universitetet). This includes three- or four-year college studies or studies in the university with the same length. The
estimations with test scores include six scores, one related to school grades (Math, Norwegian, and English), two of them relate
to agreeableness and the ease to make friends, the others relate to positivism, leadership, and scholastic competence. All of them
collected in the first wave of the survey. Number of observations in Model 1: 1,964, Model 2: 1,964, Model 3: 1,964, and Model 4:
1,861. Source: Own calculations.
female to identify a differential effect on lesbians. The income gap in this specification ranges
from 6 percent to 16.6 percent depending on the homosexuality definition. Model 4 presents the
estimation results of a model a la Neal and Johnson (1996). That is, introducing test scores as
proxies of abilities instead of the schooling attainment.11 The results are very similar to those
obtained in Model 3. These gaps amount to half of what similar estimations have found in the
U.S. labor market. This could respond to differences in the types of samples used in the analyses
or to structural features in the Norwegian labor market vis-a-vis the United States. Interestingly,
11Neal and Johnson (1996)—when exploring racial wage gaps—argue that they can bypass the endogeneity be-
tween race and education attainment on the measurement of income gaps using the stock of skills accumulated up
until mandatory schooling ends instead of controlling for schooling attainment per se. They argue that the educa-
tional and occupational choices made during adulthood that end up affecting income are themselves consequences
of the stock of skills—proxied by test scores—agents had when they started making those decisions. Hence, this
approach claims that, conditional on the skill levels, the income gap is fixed across educational levels or occupational
sectors. As Urzua (2008) shows in the case of racial income gaps, I show that this approach is not appropriate
to describe the existing labor market differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals, as the size of these gaps
differ across educational choices.
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Table 2: Gap in Yearly Income (Heckman Selection Model)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Definition lnIncome Pr(Empl=1)† lnIncome Pr(Empl=1)† lnIncome Pr(Empl=1)†
SI -0.004 -0.230*** -0.030 -0.359*** 0.020 -0.411***
(0.040) (0.067) (0.076) (0.124) (0.078) (0.128)
SI×female 0.028 0.194 -0.025 0.294*
(0.090) (0.147) (0.091) (0.150)
SP -0.047 -0.156** -0.076 -0.170 -0.053 -0.145
(0.041) (0.069) (0.072) (0.122) (0.074) (0.126)
SP×female 0.039 0.004 0.036 0.007
(0.087) (0.148) (0.089) (0.152)
SX -0.038 -0.120 -0.022 -0.039 0.008 -0.063
(0.049) (0.083) (0.077) (0.136) (0.079) (0.139)
SX×female -0.032 -0.140 -0.053 -0.029
(0.100) (0.172) (0.102) (0.176)
College X
Test Scores X
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All estimations were drawn from different Heckman selection
models with the dependent variable being the natural logarithm of yearly income among the employed population in wave four of the
survey. Omitted controls for the selection equations are age in a quadratic polynomial, gender, whether as a child the person lived
with one parent, a remarried parent or with no parents, BMI in wave one of the survey, whether the person practiced sports, skipped
school or was excluded from a class during childhood. Omitted controls in the income equations are age in a quadratic polynomial,
gender, dummies for mother’s education, dummies for mother’s SES and municipality size. The College variable takes the value of
1 when the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). This includes
three-year, four-year college studies or studies in the university with the same length. The estimations with test scores include six
scores, one related to school grades (Math, Norwegian and English), two of them relate to agreeableness and the ease to make friends,
the others relate to positivism, leadership and scholastic competence. All of them collected in the first wave of the survey. The number
of observations for Model 1: 2,326, Model 2: 2,326, and Model 3: 2,204. Source: Own calculations.
† Coefficients. Not marginal effects.
there seems to be no differential effect for lesbians. Furthermore, the mean comparisons of college
attendance presented in Table G.1 in the Appendix G show that there seems to be no systematic
evidence of either group being more likely to go to a tertiary education institution. If anything,
these results suggest that lesbians are less likely to go less to college than heterosexual women.
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2.3 The Importance of Endogenous Selection into Employment
The findings i n Table 1  a re o btained f rom a  s elected s ample—namely, t hose who a re employed. 
There are many reasons to believe those employed are not representative of the whole sample, 
as they may have observable and unobservable characteristics that contribute to their sorting (or 
not) into employment (Mroz, 1987), including—probably—homosexuality. If those characteristics 
correlate with income, the estimates in Table 1 are biased. To address this issue and provide a 
more comparable benchmark for the estimates provided by the models I estimate later in this 
paper, I present in Table 2 the results obtained from estimating models that allow for selection 
(Heckman, 1979). That is, I allow selection into employment to be endogenously determined.
The results indicate that income gaps presented in Table 1 disappear once I allow endogenous
selection into employment, regardless of the homosexuality definition and the controls used. It
provides evidence on the fact that differences in the labor market against sexual minorities may
take place at the time of getting a job and not by working for a lower wage. This result will be fully
explored in the subsequent chapters, paying especial attention to how endogenous choices that are
critical in determining income—like employment and schooling—could be affected by differences
in characteristics, both observable and unobservable, across sexual preference groups.
3 Data
This paper uses a novel data set that has not been explored by the economic literature. The
Young in Norway (YiN) is a longitudinal data set product of a research project headed by the
Program for Adolescent Research (Ungforsk) in 1990.12 YiN collects detailed information about
12The project had four main goals. First, it was designed to produce studies of the entire population, not just
specific groups. For that, the study’s design needed to have a high response rate and national representativity.
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the characteristics, attitudes, and choices of a cohort of Norwegians. In particular, it has four
features that makes it the best data set currently available to study sexual minority labor market
discrimination. First, it is longitudinal; therefore, I am able to observe respondents’ characteristics
when young. This improves over existing literature that explores income gaps of sexual minorities
using nonlongitudinal surveys, which in turn prevents researchers from differentiating away time-
invariant unobservables that might bias the results. Second, it collects scores on personality traits
and academic performance as children. I use these measures to identify the unobserved skills, a key
feature of my empirical strategy. Third, it collects detailed information about sexual preferences
and practices. This way, I do not run into absurdly small sample sizes, I can include single people
in the analysis, and I can construct a model with a continuous measure of unobserved heterogeneity
on homosexuality. Finally, YiN collects information about the job market including ISCO88 coded
occupations and yearly income. See the descriptive statistics in Appendix Table A.1.
YiN has four waves of data. The first wave was collected in 1992, when 12,287 students of lower
and upper secondary school pupils, from 67 schools in grades 7–12 (age 13–18) were interviewed.
The sampling allowed for each grade to be represented equally, and the sampling unit was the
school. Wave 2 was collected two years later. By then, the older members of the sample had
already graduated. Thus, the younger cohorts answered wave 2 in school (n=3,844), while the
older ones were contacted through the mail. The study was originally planned to end after wave
2. However, a spin-off of the study continued in 1999 but only for the younger cohorts, those who
had answered the wave 2 questionnaire in school and not by mail. 2,923 people were interviewed.
Wave 4 was collected between May 2005 and August 2006, with the target population being the
Second, the study wanted to provide researchers tools to find causal relations. Finally, the study had to be
comprehensive enough to be able to provide information of adolescents across different social arenas (Strand and
von Soest, 2008).
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same as in wave 3. In this wave, data were collected for 2,890 people. There is a great overlap
between those wave 3 and wave 4 respondents; in total, 2,562 responded both surveys. Following
advice from the experts at NOVA, the agency responsible for the data, I do not include in my
analysis respondents that were not followed up in waves 3 or 4. This leaves a final sample of 2,991.
3.1 Skills
The empirical strategy used in this paper relies on the identification of unobserved skills. Such
identification and the subsequent estimations based on this unobserved heterogeneity pose heavy
requirements on sample size. The number of observations required increases geometrically with
the number of unobserved dimensions of skill to be estimated. Given that the sample size of
homosexuals in every definition is not large, I estimate the models with one unobserved factor.
This factor will comprise both cognitive and noncognitive skills in one construct.
To identify the unobserved skills factor, I use six scores; all of them were collected in the
first wave of the survey, when the respondents were in their early to mid teens. The first four
measures come from the Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents (SPPA) (Harter, 1988). These are
self evaluations that take into account the perceived competence and the relative importance the
respondent gives to specific areas of life (Wichstraum, 1995). First, two of the measures relate
to agreeableness, one in the area of social acceptance—being able to get others to accept and
like oneself—and another one measuring how easy it is for the respondent to build close social
relationships. The third measure relates to self-esteem; similar to the widely used Rosenberg
self-esteem scale, but its wording is more appropriate to adolescents. The fourth score measures
scholastic competence, understood as the perceived cognitive competence related to schoolwork
(Harter, 2012). The fifth score relies on a scale that measures qualities like leadership and strong-
14
mindedness—makes decisions easily, is independent, willing to take a stand. Finally, the sixth
scale uses school grades in Math, Norwegian, and English.
3.2 Income Measures
The YiN data set is was not conceived as a labor force survey and thus does not contain a measure
of hourly wage. Instead, it asks about pretax personal yearly income. In addition, time worked
is not recorded. Hence, halftime workers could be earning less just because they are working less
hours. To overcome this, I compare the results I obtain on the whole sample with those I obtain
on the sample of full-time workers, for whom the income reported is more likely to come from their
work.13 Note that income measures were collected when the cohort in the sample was around 30
years old. Thus, this study focuses on labor market discrimination at relatively early stages in
their carrer. However, evidence shows that wage gaps in other contexts widen with age (Manning
and Swaffield, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2010). Hence, finding gaps at early ages is indicative of gaps
later in life.14
13In addition, there is a chance part of the income comes from rehabilitation, disability, or unemployment benefits.
However, I find that homosexuals are equally as likely to receive social benefits as heterosexuals, regardless of the
definition of homosexuality. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that any leakage in the income measures
constructed could bias the results in either direction.
14In fact, Weinberger and Kuhn (2010) suggest that the reduction of the gender wage gap observed in the last
half of the twentieth century responds more to disappearing differentials in the factors that determine initial wage
than changes in relative wage growth after labor market entry.
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Identifying Unobserved Heterogeneity
Works like Murnane et al. (1995), Heckman et al. (2006) and Espinoza et al. (2014) show that
unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., skills) is as relevant in determining life choices and adult outcomes
as other characteristics like gender or household composition. Thus, I model the outcomes Y we
are interested in (e.g., wage, schooling, employment) as the results of observable characteristics
XY (e.g., gender, tenure, local labor market) and the unobserved heterogeneity Θ, which in the
case of this paper can contain up to two dimensions: skills and the latent degree of homosexuality.
That is,
Y = XY β
Y + αY Θ + eY (2)
where Y is a M × 1 vector of outcome variables, XY is a matrix with all observable controls for
each outcome variable, and eY ⊥ (Θ,XY) is a vector of error terms with distributions feym (·)
such that eyi ⊥ eyj for every m = 1, . . . ,M . Given that Θ is unobserved, the estimation of (2) is
not straightforward. To begin with, unobserved heterogeneity factors are not well defined entities
with established scales or units of measurement. Instead they are latent variation that needs to
be inferred from variation captured in manifest variables they affect (Bartholomew et al., 2011).
The manifest variables are assumed to be the result of a linear production function of scores whose
inputs are both observable characteristics and the unobserved heterogeneity of the form
T = XTβ
T + αTΘ + eT (3)
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where T is a L × 1 vector of measurements (e.g., test scores, answers to the sexual preferences
questionnaire), XT is a matrix with all observable controls that affect each score, and eT ⊥ (Θ,XT )
is a L× 1 vector of mutually independent error terms that have associated distributions feh (·) for
every h = 1, . . . , L. Hence, I am effectively disjoining the manifest measures we observe on the
data (T) from the true latent heterogeneity (Θ). In particular, in the case of the answers to the
sexual preferences questionnaire, I am able to estimate a latent factor clean from characteristics
or contexts that may have affected the answers we do observe, but should not change the true
underlying homosexuality.
I use measurement system (3) (i.e., the variation observed in the manifest variables) to identify
fθ (·), the underlying distribution of the unobserved factors—that is, I do not assume a partic-
ular functional form. Instead, I use a two-component mixture of normals θ ∼ ωN (µ1, σ21) +
(1− ω)N (µ2, σ22) to estimate the true—and usually nonnormal—underlying distribution fθ (·) for
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity.15 The estimation of the parameters that govern fθ (·)
is crucial for the estimation the complete semistructural model because such distributions allow
me to integrate away the latent heterogeneity in all the outcomes, choices, and scores associated
with the model, while still being able to retrieve the coefficients related with it in every equation.
Identification of fθ (·) requires the identification of the loadings αT. Carneiro et al. (2003)
show that their identification requires three assumptions: first, that L ≥ 2k + 1, where k is the
number of unobserved factors in the model; second, that in the case when k > 1, the latent factors
are orthogonal to each other; and third, that we normalize one of the loadings associated to each
factor to 1. To observe how the assumptions work for identification, take for instance the case
15The mixture of normals allows me to not only replicate a wide range of distributions but also integrate
numerically using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which is particularly useful for calculating
´





(Judd, 1998). For a more detailed analysis regarding the estimation of the skills’ distributions
see Sarzosa and Urzua (2016).
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when k = 1, requiring L ≥ 3. Thus, system (3) would become
T1 = XTβ
1 + α1θ + e1
T2 = XTβ
2 + α2θ + e2
T3 = XTβ
3 + θ + e3
where α3 = 1 is the nummeraire. Note that COV (T1,T2|XT )
COV (T1,T3|XT )
= α2 and COV (T1,T2|XT )
COV (T2,T3|XT )
= α1. Then,







, and together with the fact that eT ⊥ Θ rely on the Kotlarski Theorem which shows that
using the joint distribution of (J1, J2, . . . , JL) one can nonparametrically identify the distributions
of Θ and ẽT—and thus eT—up to one normalization (Kotlarski, 1967).
The complete structure of the model, including the parameters that describe the distributions
of the underlying factor fθ (·), is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The





 fey1 (XY1 , Y1, ζ)× · · · × feyM (XYM , YM , ζ)
×fe1 (XT1 , T1, ζ)× · · · × feL (XTL , TL, ζ)
 dFθ (ζ) (4)
In Section 2.3, I showed the importance of taking selection into account. The model presented
in Equation (2) can accommodate such outcomes by expanding vector Y to include an indicator


















where 1 [A] denotes an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if A is true. Thus, I am effectively
using a type-II Tobit model (Amemiya, 1985, p. 385) in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity,
allowing endogenous choices of employment to depend on observable characteristics and unobserved
traits like skills or latent homosexuality.16
4.2 Roy Model: Allowing for Endogenous Choice of Schooling
Norway has a relatively high tertiary education enrollment rate; around 62 percent of people in the
sample go to a tertiary education institution of some sort. A vast literature on returns to schooling
shows that differences in access to tertiary education is critical in determining difference in earned
income (Mincer, 1958; Becker and Chiswick, 1966; Card, 2001). Therefore, part of the sexual
preference income gap could be explained by differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals
in enrollment rates in tertiary education. A model of potential outcomes that endogenizes schooling
choices inspired by the Roy model (Roy, 1951) can easily be introduced as a special case of the
setup presented above in subsection 4.1. For that, suppose vector Y in Equation (2) is comprised
by five rows (i.e., M = 5), where one row contains a binary choice D (e.g., going to college D = 1
or not D = 0) and the other four contain the outcomes of interest that depend on such choice
(e.g., wage and employment for those that went to college (Y1, E1) and wage and employment for
16System (5) can be effectively estimated as a Heckman selection model by estimating y = XY βY + αY θ +
ψIMR+ eYc on the selected sample, where IMR = φ(XE β̂
E+α̂Eθ)/Φ(XE β̂E+α̂Eθ) is the Inverse Mills Ratio obtained
from a probit on the selection equation.
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where XD represents a set of exogenous or predetermined observables that affect the choice. XD
and XY could share elements. An exclusion restriction (i.e., a source of variation present in XD but
not in XY ) would secure identification of the model without the need to rely on its nonlinearity.
An important feature of the Roy model is that individuals must choose between two sectors,
for example, treated and not treated depending on their comparative advantage (Heckman and
Honore, 1990). Therefore, both the decision and the outcomes are endogenous based on observable
and unobservable characteristics of the individuals. This feature is key in the development of coun-
terfactuals in Section 5.3. The empirical strategy assumes that after controlling for the unobserved
heterogeneity Θ, the remaining error terms are independent (i.e., eD ⊥ eY1 ⊥ eY0 ⊥ eE1 ⊥ eE0)







1− fD (XD, YD, ζ)
)
[feY0 (XY , Y0, ζ) feE0 (XE , E, ζ)]




fD (XD, YD, ζ) [feY1 (XY , Y1, ζ) feE1 (XE , E, ζ)]
E1 (1− feE1 (XE , E, ζ))
1−E1
]D
fe1 (XT1 , T1, ζ) fe2 (XT2 , T2, ζ)× · · · × feL (XTL , TL, ζ)
 dFθ (ζ)
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5 Results: Homosexuality as Dichotomous Variables
5.1 General Distribution of Skills
Let me introduce the unobserved heterogeneity and the Roy model of potential outcomes in a
























γY1Gay + XY β









γY0Gay + XY β
Y0 + αY0θ + eY0
)

where θ comes from a distribution estimated using the complete sample.17 In this case, the
parameters of interest are γD, γE0 , γE1 , γY0 and γY1 .18
Table 3 presents the results. First, it shows that, even after controlling for skills, college
attendance does not differ across sexual preferences. It also shows that discrimination takes place in
accessing jobs and not in the pay itself, and that these gaps are larger among college educated than
among those with no college education. Table 3 indicates that college-educated homosexual men
according to the SI definition are 18 percentage points less likely to be employed and 30 percentage
points less likely to have a full time job than comparable heterosexuals. SI homosexual men without
17See the estimation of the measurement system of test scores for the whole sample from which the distribution
of the latent skills θ are identified in Table E.1 and the estimated distribution of skills θ in Figure E.1 in Appendix
E.
18For completeness, I estimate a model without an education choice equation—which is the closest to the reduced
form estimates in the existing literature—and present its results in Appendix B.
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college education are 10 percentage points less likely to be employed and 15.6 percentage points
less likely to have a full-time job than comparable heterosexuals.
Among women, Table 3 also shows an employability gap against lesbians. In particular, against
the college educated ones, with gaps ranging between 7.3 and 13 percentage points.
The results of Table 3 attest to the importance of a model that allows for endogenous choices and
separate estimates for two different sectors. This way, I find particular sectors where discrimination
is stronger, namely among the higher educated workers.
5.2 Separate Distributions: Unobserved Abilities
The main drawback of the empirical strategy used above is that it restricts the estimates of the 
model to be the same for homosexuals and heterosexuals. If there are any differences in the skill 
distributions, or in the labor market returns to observable and unobservable characteristics, the 
results presented above could be misleading. Therefore, in this subsection, I present the results of 
models that allow me to estimate a complete set of different parameters for heterosexuals and 
homosexuals, including the skills’ distributions.
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Table 3: Effect of Homosexuality on Annual Income, Employment and College, Roy Model With
Overall Distribution
SI SP SX
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
College†
Gay 0.089 (0.203) 0.105 (0.192) 0.346* (0.205)
GayXFemale -0.017 (0.240) -0.152 (0.234) -0.784*** (0.272)
SI SP SX
Income Employed Income Employed Income Employed
Employed
No College
Gay 9.320 -0.457* 9.879 -0.296 -4.722 -0.287
(23.098) (0.250) (19.766) (0.240) (21.987) (0.271)
GayXFemale -2.829 0.186 4.223 0.085 22.883 0.038
(25.114) (0.304) (23.204) (0.296) (26.865) (0.334)
College
Gay -5.995 -0.640*** -32.440 -0.404** 1.765 -0.130
(24.034) (0.157) (19.811) (0.161) (17.996) (0.173)
GayXFemale 0.418 0.487*** 17.293 0.291 -27.863 -0.017
(23.615) (0.185) (21.409) (0.194) (22.636) (0.223)
Obs.(N|Cnsrd) 2274 1821 2280 1828 2283 1827
FullTime4
No College
Gay 14.468 -0.432* 10.439 -0.251 -22.528 -0.055
(23.809) (0.239) (20.205) (0.230) (21.501) (0.269)
GayXFemale -38.460 0.632** -1.006 0.329 18.503 0.232
(32.498) (0.282) (27.802) (0.274) (31.324) (0.323)
College
Gay 13.425 -0.772*** -3.184 -0.625*** 11.515 -0.260
(30.958) (0.152) (27.221) (0.154) (20.460) (0.162)
GayXFemale -29.256 0.807*** -15.434 0.600*** -41.058 0.351*
(33.421) (0.176) (28.976) (0.182) (27.361) (0.208)
Obs.(N|Cnsrd) 2335 1409 2340 1415 2345 1414
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The coefficients presented are the ones associated with the homosexuality indicators.
The College variable takes the value of 1 when the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole)
or universities (universitetet). This includes three-year, four-year college studies or studies in the university with the same
length. The controls used in the College choice equation and not presented in the Table are: age, age squared, gender,
dummies for father’s education, dummies for mother’s education, whether as a child the person lived with one parent, a
remarried parent or with no parents, number of books available at home as a child, and the unobservable factor of skills.
The controls used in the income equations and not presented in the Table are age, age squared, gender, dummies for Father
SES, population of the municipality, height and the unobservable factor of skills. Source: Own calculations.
† Coefficients, not marginal effects.
23
Figures 2 presents the estimated skill distributions for heterosexuals and homosexuals accord-
ing to each definition of homosexuality.19 It is easy to see that not assuming normality and instead
empirically estimating the distributions pays off as they are far from normally distributed, espe-
cially the ones from homosexuals. Figures 2 show that skills among homosexuals are more tightly
distributed. While the standard deviation of skills among heterosexuals is around 0.33, it is be-
tween 0.12 to 0.22 for homosexuals. This interesting difference in the distribution of unobserved
skills may have important consequences on schooling and occupational sorting and also in the
income obtained when adults.
By construction, all the estimated distributions of unobserved ability are centered at zero.20
However, Urzua (2008) shows that with a minor linearity assumption, one can use the difference
between the estimated constants of the test score equations that contain the nummeraire loadings
to infer the difference in means of the skill distributions of two groups. Figure 2 is depicted in a
way such that the centers of the skills distributions of homosexuals are shifted to represent the
difference in means with respect to those of heterosexuals. Importantly, none of these differences in
the means of skill distributions between homosexuals and heterosexuals are statistically significant.
Effect of Skills on Outcomes. With different estimated distributions of skills for every sub-
population, I am able to estimate different models of potential outcomes and endogenous choices
19Because of sample size issues I can only estimate this kind of models for homosexuals according to the SI and
SP definitions of homosexuality.
20This comes from the fact that I estimate fθ (·) using a mixture of Q normals that will be combined using weights
ωq. The weight of the last normal needs to fulfill ωQ = 1−
∑Q−1
q=1 ωq. In the same way, given that all equations contain
intercepts, the mean of the last normal µQ is one such that
∑Q
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where the parameters labeled with S correspond to heterosexuals and the ones labeled with G
correspond to homosexuals. Tables C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix present the estimates of the
sexual preference-specific coefficients associated with skills for income, employment and tertiary
education. They show that skills are important determinants of sorting into tertiary education
regardless of the sexual orientation. Interestingly, skills have significant positive returns only for
those that undertook some sort of tertiary education. However, the results also show that the
returns to skills do differ between heterosexuals and homosexuals, supporting the use of a model
that allows different parameters across sexual preferences. The numbers in Tables C.1 and C.2
indicate that skills have stronger effects on income for homosexuals than for heterosexuals. In
particular, while a one standard deviation increase in skills among college-educated heterosexuals
causes yearly income to increase by around 8.8 percent to 11.7 percent, the yearly income increase
due to a one standard deviation increase in skills among college educated homosexuals ranges
between 14 and 39 percent.21
Goodness of Fit of the Model. Tables C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C present evidence on the
models’ goodness-of-fit on the first and second moments for annual income, college enrollment and
21To obtain these figures, I take the loadings from Tables C.1 and C.2, normalize them using the standard
deviation of the skills distributions, and divide them by the relevant yearly income mean that can be found in Table
4. For instance, the returns to one SD of skills among college-educated heterosexuals under the definition SI is
76.439*0.33/287.018=8.8 percent.
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employment. They are a product of 40,000 simulations of the model based on as many different
draws from the distributions of skills. The models do very well in predicting the means and
standard deviations for each definition of income and homosexuality. The performance of the
models predicting income for homosexuals is remarkable considering the reduced sample size the
models are facing.
5.3 Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes
From the results I have provided so far, it is possible to argue three facts: 1) that unobserved
skills are important determinants of choices and income earned, 2) that the way skills affect
those labor market outcomes depends on the sexual preference of the individual, and 3) that
skills follow different distributions for homosexuals and heterosexuals. Hence, based on these
three facts, one could hypothesize that the income and employment gaps observed could respond
to these estimated differences in skill distributions, and that the portion of the gap that is not
explained by such differences—or differences in observable characteristics—could be attributed to
plain discrimination.
One can use the structure of the model to evaluate these claims (Urzua, 2008). In particular,
it is possible to use the model to simulate the outcomes that homosexuals would have obtained
if their skills came from the heterosexual skills distribution and/or if they had the observable
characteristics heterosexuals have.22 This way, I can tease out the differences in labor market
outcomes that are due to differences in the skills available across the groups from the differences
that are due to plain discrimination. It is evident from Figure 2 that the distribution of skills
22See the differences in observable characteristics across groups in Table G.3 in Appendix G.
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among homosexuals has a higher mean, but a lower variance than that of heterosexuals.23 This
makes the counterfactual exercise even more compelling: it is not clear the direction outcomes will
change—or if they will change at all—as there will be on average a lower stock of skills, but at the
same time, there will be people with substantially higher and lower stocks of skills than before.














































D and unobservable skills
θHθ . The supra-index denotes the sexual preference group (i.e., H = {S,G}). Hence, for instance,



















. These are the values presented in Tables C.3 and C.4. I can use this










the simulated income earned by homosexuals when given skills drawn from the heterosexuals’ skills
distribution but keeping the observable characteristics as they are. Consequently, the simulated
income earned by homosexuals when given the skills and observable characteristics of heterosexuals




















are endogenous is an important fea-
ture of the model that affects the simulation of counterfactuals. That is, when counterfactuals are











but also of indirect changes through the schooling and employ-
23Why the moments of the distributions of skills would differ is outside the scope of this paper. It may be due
to the different contexts homosexuals have to face while growing up, being more likely to be bullied or harassed,
which end up affecting the stock of skills with which they reach adulthood (Sarzosa, 2015).
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ment decisions. For instance, when simulating the model for homosexuals but giving them skills
















. This materializes the very important fact that education and employment decisions
are taken based on observable and unobservable characteristics, and once these change, people
might choose differently. Hence, the measure of the total income gaps between the two groups
need to incorporate the differences that arise from both the direct and indirect channels. That is,






























































































∣∣∣DG (XHXD , θHθ) = 0]E [Y G0 (XHXY , θHθ) ∣∣∣DG (XHXD , θHθ) = 0]
(8)































) ∣∣DG (XHXD , θHθ) = D ]) are important in determining the overall income gap
because they mediate the way income differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals for each
level of education or employment choice enter in the overall gap calculation.
Table 4 presents the results using two counterfactual simulations on college enrollment, em-



























both the censored and the uncensored income means. With the label basic, I present the fitted



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































). Under the label Equalizing Gender, I present the
simulations correcting for the fact that there are more women than men defined as homosexuals
(see Table 1), and if women earn consistently less than men, the gaps I calculate could be confound-
ing the effect of belonging to a sexual minority with the effect of being a woman. By equalizing
the gender distributions across groups, I prevent gender discrimination biasing the comparisons.
Under the label Het. Unobs, I present the simulated college enrollment, employment, and income
means of homosexuals when the gender distribution and the unobservables are taken from the


























Table 5 presents the estimated gaps between heterosexuals and homosexuals under the coun-
terfactuals described above and using the intuition of Equation (8). Table 5 shows that relative to
heterosexuals, homosexuals are 6.5 percent more likely to achieve tertiary education, they are 10
percentage points less likely to be employed, and once employed they earn 9.45 percent (SI) and
12 percent (SP) less.25 Going into detail, the results show that the income gaps are larger among
college-educated workers, who earn 10.2 percent (SI) and 16 percent (SP) less than comparable
heterosexuals.
Table 5 also shows that the only effect equalizing the gender distribution in the sexual minority
groups is the elimination of the earning gaps among workers with no college education.
When I equate skills distributions and gender rations across sexual preferences, income gaps
disappear for those employed. The effect is evident regardless of the tertiary education choice. This
is due to the high returns skills have among homosexuals, and it happens despite the fact that
25Figures obtained from dividing the gap calculated on the censored income by the mean income of hetero-
sexuals under each definition. For instance, the proportional gap under the SI definition is given by 9.45 per-
cent=26.848/283.99.
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in this scenario, homosexuals would be 4.1 percent less likely to go to college than heterosexuals.
However, homosexuals remain less employable by 19 and 10 percentage points for the SI and SP
definitions, respectively. That is, the overall probability of getting a job would worsen by 6.5
percentage points in the case of the SI definition, relative to the counterfactual where only the
gender proportions were equalized. This effect would come mainly from the further deterioration
that would take place in the probability of being employed among people that would not have gone
to college. The gap in employment probability against non-college-educated homosexuals would
amount to 30.1 (SI) and 11.7 (SP) percentage points.
The results of the last counterfactual simulation indicate that there is no evidence of income
discrimination among people that are working. However, becoming employed is the difficult part
for homosexuals. The counterfactual simulations show that there is a 10.3–19.4 percentage point
difference in the probability of being employed that cannot be explained due to differences of skills
and gender composition. That gap is discrimination. And this is where the flexibility of the model
with endogenous choices helps interpreting how the mechanisms that create the gaps work. Based
on the loadings presented in Table C.2, it is evident that highly skilled homosexuals will sort into
college, and among those, due to discrimination, the most highly skilled will be able to sort into
employment. Hence, the ones who end up college-educated and employed are a very select group
who face high returns to their high stocks of skills. That way, I can reconcile the fact that, in
the last counterfactual, homosexuals were provided with a distribution of skills that had greater
variance with the elimination of the gap among those who managed to get a job. The barrier
homosexuals face is getting a job—a barrier that becomes taller for those who did not sort into
college education simply because they have fewer skills than the ones who did.
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6 Homosexuality as a Latent Continuous Variable
6.1 Identification of the latent homosexuality factor
Homosexuality is not a dichotomous variable, but a continuum of sexual preferences and percep-
tions. To incorporate that definition, I  develop a  model i n which homosexuality i s an additional 
source of unobserved heterogeneity. Such an approach is particularly well suited in this case as ho-
mosexuality is often veiled and only in some cases it is openly manifested or inferred by others. In 
that sense, homosexuality is a continuous characteristic—unobserved to the econometrician—that 
influences the answers given to the the sexual preferences/perceptions questionnaire, resembling the 
relation between latent skills and manifest scores presented in Section 4.1. Furthermore, latent 
factor models allows pro- or antigay contexts in which the respondent lives to mediate the answers 
to the questionnaire. Hence, I use the reported answers to the questions on sexual preferences, 
sexual interest, and gender of sexual partners as three manifest scores that are affected by the true 
latent homosexuality $ and societal, household or personal or contexts XS
SSX = XSβSX + λSX$ + εSX
SSP = XSβSP + λSP$ + εSP (9)
SSI = XSβSI + λSI$ + εSI
where εSX ⊥ εSP ⊥ εSI . Then, using the framework presented in Section 4.1, I identify the
underlying distribution of the unobserved degree of homosexuality F$ (·) clean from observable
contexts that could affect the answers collected in the sexual preferences/perceptions questionnaire.
In practice, however, a complication arises because answers to the questionnaire are not
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smoothly spread out across the possible categories. The majority of respondents locate them-
selves at the heterosexual extreme in each question. In consequence, measurement system (9) 
needs to be modified to accommodate such skewed distributions of the a nswers. To do so, I  allow 
SSX and SSP to be binary scores that take the value of one if the respondent chose any answer 
different to the extreme heterosexual option. I allow SSI to be a left-tailed censored variable for 
which there is a mass at the heterosexual extreme and number of individuals in each of the other 
categories that report increasing levels of homosexuality. It is important to note that while the 
manifest scores are not continuous, the latent score is. Therefore, measurement system (9) 
becomes:
SSX = 1 [XSβSX + λSX$ + εSX ]
SSP = 1 [XSβSP + λSP$ + εSP ]
SSI =

0 if XSβSI + λSI$ + εSI ≤ 0
XSβSI + λSI$ + εSI if XSβSI + λSI$ + εSI > 0
(10)
Assuming that εSX , εSP , and εSI follow a standard normal, then the estimation entails a system
comprised by two probits and a type-I Tobit model—in Amemiya (1985, p. 384) parlance—with
unobserved heterogeneity. Identification of all parameters in the system, including the ones that
determine F$ (·), require the normalization λSI/σεSI = 1.
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6.1.1 Complete Sample
Table 6: Identification of Homosexuality as a Latent Factor
Sex. Partnera Self Perceptionb Sex. Interestc
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Complete Sample (Obs.=2859)
Age -0.355 (0.303) 0.358 (0.375) 0.311 (0.360)
Age Sq. 0.010 (0.010) -0.016 (0.012) -0.012 (0.012)
Female 0.279*** (0.091) 0.892*** (0.107) 1.431*** (0.114)
MotherSES: High 0.412*** (0.154) 0.375** (0.166) 0.657*** (0.179)
LivesBothParents -0.369*** (0.101) -0.363*** (0.107) -0.223* (0.115)
Latent Homosex. 0.578*** (0.047) 0.774*** (0.070) 1
Constant 1.449 (2.330) -3.427 (2.853) -4.150 (2.766)
Men (Obs.=1291)
Age 0.048 (0.557) 0.547 (0.747) 1.923 (1.244)
Age Sq. -0.002 (0.018) -0.022 (0.025) -0.066 (0.042)
MotherSES: High 0.660** (0.265) 1.032*** (0.296) 2.090*** (0.528)
LivesBothParents -0.400** (0.165) -0.597*** (0.192) -0.328 (0.269)
Latent Homosex. 0.417*** (0.059) 0.578*** (0.084) 1
Constant -2.179 (4.261) -5.434 (5.641) -18.127** (9.128)
Women (Obs.=1568)
Age -0.510 (0.357) 0.232 (0.385) 0.078 (0.413)
Age Sq. 0.015 (0.011) -0.011 (0.012) -0.003 (0.013)
MotherSES: High 0.423** (0.197) 0.209 (0.192) 0.538** (0.238)
LivesBothParents -0.351*** (0.126) -0.252** (0.119) -0.200 (0.149)
Latent Homosex. 0.495*** (0.055) 0.567*** (0.065) 1
Constant 2.891 (2.751) -1.766 (2.935) -1.350 (3.190)
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations.
aBinary Score. Takes the value of one if respondent has ever had at least one sexual partner of the same gender. Estimated as
a probit.
bBinary Score. Takes the value of one if respondent considers he/she is non-heterosexual in any degree. Estimated as a probit.
cLeft-tail censored variable. Estimated as a tobit.
Table 6 presents the estimated parameters of the measurement system (10) used to identify the
latent factor of homosexuality for the complete sample. It shows that the latent factor presented in
Figure 3 greatly affects the scores purveyed by the answers to the sexual preferences/perceptions
questionnaire. In fact, my findings suggest that the factor loadings are large and statistically
different from zero at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, as expected, some contexts matter in
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the determination of the answers to the questionnaire. The results in Table 6 show that women
and people that come from a high SES household tend to report higher homosexuality scores,
while those that live with both parents as a child tend to do the opposite. These are interesting
findings as they epitomize the role contexts play in determining the answers to the sexual pref-
erences/perceptions questionnaire. They show that people of higher SES have less trouble with
revealing a nonzero degree of homosexuality in all three measures, while people with biparental
households during childhood have a harder time doing so.
6.1.2 Identification of Gender-Specific Homosexuality Factors
The empirical approach I follow in this section allows me to further explore differences in discrimi-
nation against homosexuals depending on the gender of the worker. Not finding any discrimination
could be a misleading result that masks the possibility of the existence of gender-specific effects of
discrimination. To overcome this, I identify gender-specific unobserved homosexual heterogeneity
distributions, using the measurement system whose estimates are also presented in Table 6. They
show that SES and household composition affect the homosexuality scores reported independently
from the gender of the sample used.
6.2 Homosexuality Factor, Education, and Labor Market
Having estimated the distribution from which the latent homosexuality heterogeneity is drawn, I
can use it to estimate the effect that latent variable has on different outcomes. Furthermore, I
keep controlling for the other source of unobserved heterogeneity: skills that I identified for the
complete and the gender-specific samples using the measurement system (3). Hence, the labor
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market variables can be analyzed using a model like (2) as follows:
Y = XY β




where Θ = [θ,$] are the dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity and θ are the latent skills and
$ is the unobserved homosexuality factor. The usual assumptions for the error terms hold. That
is, eY ⊥ (τ,$,XY) distributed following feym (·) such that eyi ⊥ eyj for every m = 1, . . . ,M .
6.2.1 Models without Endogenous Choice of Schooling
As with the previous models used in this paper, I would like to start the analysis of the effect of
homosexuality as unobserved heterogeneity using a model that allows for endogenous choices on
employment but without the endogenous choice of education. That is, models of the form
E = 1
[
αE + βEXE + α
Eθ + λE$ + ε > 0
]
Y = α + βXY + ψIMR + α
Y θ + λY$ + ε if E = 1
Table 7 presents the results for the complete sample and for the gender specific samples. In
particular, it shows that discrimination against homosexuals happens at the time of obtaining a
job and not at the income earned itself. It is evident that the homosexuality factor is negatively
related with the probability of being employed, while that is not the case for the income earned.26
To analyze the dimensions of those gaps, I use the estimates to predict employment and income
26Table G.2 in the Appendix presents further evidence on the effect of the homosexuality factor on labor-market-
related choices. They are the results of estimating models with latent skills on a number of choices like labor market
participation, employment, full time employment and working in a white collar occupation. In line with previous
results, they indicate that people with a higher degree of homosexuality are less likely to be economically active
and employed. Also, it shows no relation between the homosexuality factor and the likelihood of working in a white
collar occupation.
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Table 7: Homosexuality Factor in Model with Selection Equations
Overall Sample Males Females
Income Employed Income Employed Income Employed
IncomeEmpl
Latent Homosex. -2.325 -0.080*** -3.602 -0.065*** -2.609 -0.061**
(2.776) (0.019) (2.642) (0.021) (2.807) (0.026)
Latent Skills 29.734* 0.415*** 39.490** 0.272 19.398 0.502***
(15.663) (0.135) (18.402) (0.189) (19.711) (0.173)
Obs.(N|Censored) 2214 1781 971 803 1243 978
IncomeFullTime4
Latent Homosex. -3.695 -0.075*** -2.401 -0.075*** -6.764** 0.022
(2.890) (0.020) (2.995) (0.020) (3.036) (0.022)
Latent Skills 24.375 0.447*** 29.363 0.287 9.903 0.282*
(17.671) (0.145) (19.906) (0.175) (20.836) (0.154)
Obs.(N|Censored) 1816 1383 982 738 1293 645
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The controls used in all the equation and not presented in the Table are: age, age
squared, gender (complete sample only), dummies for father’s education, whether as a child the person lived with one parent,
a remarried parent or with no parents, and the Inverse Mills Ratio. Source: Own calculations.
for each level of the homosexuality factor by simulating them with 40,000 draws of each source of
unobserved heterogeneity.27
Figure 4 shows the results of the simulations on the employment margin—those on the income
part of the model can be found in Figure F.1 in Appendix F. They indicate that going from the
heterosexual extreme to the homosexual extreme of the homosexuality factor distribution—holding
everything else constant—decreases the probability of being employed by 14.76 percentage points,
a number consistent with the gaps measured in Section 5 based on the dichotomous definitions of
homosexuality. The same pattern is observed when analyzing full-time workers. High levels of the
latent factor of homosexuality face a probability of being full-time employed 9 percentage points
27Tables D.1 and D.2 in the Appendix show that the models do a good job fitting the means and standard errors
of the actual labor market variables.
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lower.
As mentioned above, one of the advantages of analyzing homosexuality as a source of un-
observed heterogeneity is that I can estimate gender-specific homosexuality factors and analyze
discrimination against gay men separately from discrimination against lesbians. Using the gender
specific model whose results I also present in Table 7, and whose goodness-of-fit I also check in
Tables D.1 and D.2 in the appendix, I predict the probability of employment and income for each
level of the homosexuality factor.
Gender-Specific Model, Men: Figure 5 analyzes labor market discrimination against gay men.
They show a steep negative gradient between the level of latent homosexuality and the chances
of getting a job. In fact, extreme homosexual men are 18.11 percentage points less likely to be
employed and 25.54 percentage points less likely to hold a full-time job than extreme heterosexual
men.
Gender-Specific Model, Women: Discrimination against homosexual women is different.
Figure 6 shows that the employment situation of women depends on whether they are full time
employed or not. Homosexual women face a 13.57 percentage points lower probability of finding
a job than extreme heterosexual women. However, lesbians have the same probability of finding
a full-time job as heterosexual women. Due to this lack of selection and contrary to the men’s
situation, homosexual women do face discrimination in terms of income in full-time jobs. Women
with high values of the homosexuality factor receive, on average, an income from their full-time
jobs that is 16.39 percent shorter that what comparable heterosexual women receive.
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6.2.2 Models with Endogenous Choice of Schooling (Roy Model)
Now, I consider a full Roy model of endogenous college choice. It allows me to see any differential
effects of homosexuality on income and employment by education level. The estimated model
is very similar to the system of equations presented in (6), with an extension to include two
dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity: skills and homosexuality.
Table 8 presents the main results of the estimation on the complete and the gender-specific
samples.28 It shows that homosexual men are more likely to go to college than their heterosexual
counterparts by about 15.7 percentage points—the figure comes from comparing those in the first
decile of the homosexuality factor to those in the top decile. Such a phenomenon is not present
among women. Although Table 7 shows that homosexuality affects the chances of getting both
a job and a full-time job, Table 8 reveals that the selection channels in each margin differ: while
homosexuality diminishes the probability of being employed regardless of the education level (by
about 12 percentage points according to Figures 7), it does so only to the college educated in the
full-time job margin (by about 10 percentage points).29
Table 8 also documents gender-specific effects. In fact, in Section 6.2.1 I already showed
that labor market discrimination against homosexual women works differently than the discrimination
against homosexual men. The Roy model with endogenous education choices allows me to check
the extent to which discrimination varies across levels of educational attainment at each gender.
I find that the employment discrimination against homosexual men documented in Table 7 is
driven mainly by the employment discrimination against college-educated homosexual men. In
28Goodness-of-fit of the models is presented in Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3 in the Appendix. The models perform
extremely well in fitting the first and second moments of the variables observed in the data.
29For the sake of brevity, I do not present the simulations to every outcome in each subsample in the main text.
They can be found in Appendix F.
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Table 8: Homosexuality Factor in a Roy Model with Selection Equations
College† Income Employed†
NoCollege College NoCollege College
IncomeEmpl
Overall
Latent Homosex. 0.019 1.998 -4.329* -0.077** -0.065***
(0.020) (2.929) (2.391) (0.037) (0.024)
Latent Skills 0.380*** 23.894 47.461*** 0.166 0.659***
(0.133) (17.191) (16.953) (0.238) (0.176)
Males
Latent Homosex. 0.043** -0.944 -3.098 -0.040 -0.070***
(0.019) (2.785) (2.621) (0.038) (0.027)
Latent Skills 0.349** 25.439 71.259*** -0.006 0.593**
(0.173) (21.779) (25.955) (0.324) (0.261)
Females
Latent Homosex. -0.012 3.417 -4.137 -0.075 -0.038
(0.026) (2.976) (2.788) (0.050) (0.030)
Latent Skills 0.532*** 10.660 27.472 0.315 0.663***
(0.181) (19.457) (19.879) (0.305) (0.221)
IncomeFullTime4
Overall
Latent Homosex. 0.021 0.273 -3.077 0.000 -0.035
(0.020) (3.397) (2.589) (0.034) (0.022)
Latent Skills 0.350*** 33.182 36.756* 0.147 0.415***
(0.129) (20.183) (19.080) (0.216) (0.155)
Males
Latent Homosex. 0.047** -1.047 -1.238 -0.032 -0.084***
(0.019) (2.996) (2.793) (0.035) (0.025)
Latent Skills 0.331* 34.831 41.267 -0.116 0.660***
(0.170) (22.595) (27.263) (0.301) (0.244)
Females
Latent Homosex. -0.012 0.372 -4.553 0.046 0.021
(0.025) (3.345) (3.103) (0.044) (0.026)
Latent Skills 0.477*** 8.148 29.693 0.316 0.247
(0.173) (23.676) (22.790) (0.279) (0.194)
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls used in the college choice equation are: age, age squared,
gender (in the overall sample), municipality population, mother’s and father’s education, indicators of skipping
school, taken out of classroom and police contact while teenager. Controls in the selection equations are: age,
age squared, gender (in the overall sample), whether as a child the person lived with both parents, indicator
for practicing sports while teenager and male labor force participation rate in the 25 to 39 age bracket in the
municipality. Controls in the income equations are: age, age squared, gender (in the overall sample), father’s
SES, and mother’s education. The College variable takes the value of 1 when the person has undertaken any
kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). This includes three-year, four-
year college studies or studies in the university with the same length. Total observations for overall, male and
female employed sample: 2,127, 937 and 1,190. Total observations for overall, male and female full time sample:
2,218, 951 and 1,267. Source: Own calculations. †Coefficients, not marginal effects.
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fact, Figures 8 suggest that the employment gap between college educated heterosexual men and
college-educated men with high values of the homosexuality factor is 22 percentage points. The
gap balloons to 31 percentage points if we consider full-time employment. Consistent with previous
results, I find no effect of latent homosexuality on the income earned on the job, regardless of the
education choice.
The results in Table 8 indicate that the gap in the probability of employment against homo-
sexual women documented in Table 7 is due mainly to the discrimination faced by homosexuals
without college education. It also shows that college-educated lesbians are the ones who face the
income penalty documented above. In fact, the simulated income earned once employed for each
level of homosexuality factor presented in Figures 9 show that employed homosexual women earn
10.7 percent less than the extreme heterosexual ones, and 11.37 percent if they are employed full
time.
7 Conclusions
This paper incorporates differences in skill distributions and tastes for schooling and employment
into the analysis and quantification of the gaps in labor market outcomes observed against homo-
sexual workers. In the process, I extend the Roy model with unobserved heterogeneity to account
for endogenous choices of employment. The results from the model indicate that there are in fact
differences in the variance distribution of unobserved skills characteristics between homosexual and
heterosexual workers, and that these traits have different effects on education and employment
choices, as well as different returns in terms of income across different sexual preferences groups.
In particular, skills are more rewarded in terms of income among homosexuals than among hetero-
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sexuals. All these results indicate that there are several forces working simultaneously in opening
the income gaps observed.
My findings indicate that homosexuals face a probability of finding a job that is 10–20 percent-
age points lower than the probability faced by a heterosexual. I find that the gap is not explained
by differences in the stock of skills or gender composition. I also find that once employed, homosex-
uals face no income gap because the ones that get a job are highly skilled, and the market rewards
those skills profusely. In a second model, I incorporate homosexuality as a latent continuous con-
struct. My findings corroborate the ones obtained from the previous models, attesting to the fact
that the biggest hurdle homosexuals face in the labor market is getting a job. Furthermore, the
second model allows me to analyze gender-specific outcomes. I find that discrimination in getting
a job is greater for homosexual men, but lesbians are also penalized through the income earned,
especially the college-educated who manage to get a full-time job.
This is the first paper to incorporate endogenous decisions and unobserved heterogeneity in the
analysis of income discrimination against homosexuals. My results show that the overall income
gaps observed come entirely from a significant difference in the probability of being employed.
Thus, future research is required to improve our understanding of the reasons behind these em-
ployability differences. That way, economic research will provide arguments that will help to push
forward equality, as barriers against sexual minorities continue to fall in other aspects of life.
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Figures













Observations 644 591 350
% of Population
Overall 22.0 20.2 11.9
Males 11.4 12.9 10.2
Females 30.7 26.1 13.3
Note: The left panel presents the number and proportion of homosexuals in the sample according to
each definition of homosexuality. The right panel presents the Venn’s diagram of those observations and
definitions in the data. SI corresponds to sexual interests and considers to be homosexual any individual
that is attracted in any degree to people of the same sex. SP corresponds self-perception considers as
homosexual any individual that believes he or she is homosexual in any degree. SX corresponds to
whether a person has had sex with someone from the same gender. Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Unobserved Abilities by Sexual Preference
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Note: Estimated from measurement systems presented in Tables E.2 to E.5 in Appendix E. Each estimation use
the mixing of two normals. Left densities are estimated for those defined as homosexual and heterosexual according
to the SI definition. The distributional parameters for the skills of the homosexuals are given by µ1 = −0.153,
σ1 = 0.174, µ2 = 0.044, σ2 = 0.107, and the mixing probability is 0.223. The distributional parameters for the skills
of the heterosexuals are given by µ1 = −0.585, σ1 = 0.483, µ2 = 0.032, σ2 = 0.296, and the mixing probability is
0.051. Right densities are estimated for those defined as homosexual and heterosexual according to the SP definition.
The distributional parameters for the skills of the homosexuals are given by µ1 = −0.450, σ1 = 0.142, µ2 = 0.057,
σ2 = 0.157, and the mixing probability is 0.113. The distributional parameters for the skills of the heterosexuals
are given by µ1 = −0.690, σ1 = 0.450, µ2 = 0.024, σ2 = 0.290, and the mixing probability is 0.033. Source: Own
calculations.
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Note: Estimated from measurement systems presented in Table 6. Estimations use the mixing of two normals. Left
density is estimated for the complete sample. µ1 = 0.969, σ1 = 4.318, µ2 = −3.264, σ2 = 1.429, and the mixing
probability is 0.104. The right figure presents the gender-specific densities. For males: µ1 = 0.825, σ1 = 3.115,
µ2 = −2.274, σ2 = 3.089, and the mixing probability is 0.734. For women: µ1 = −0.033, σ1 = 4.441, µ2 = 0.005,
σ2 = 1.617, and the mixing probability is 0.133. Source: Own calculations.
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: own calculations.
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: own calculations.
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Figure 6: Women
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: own calculations.
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Figure 7: Probability of Being Employed
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: own calculations.
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Figure 8: Men: Probability of Being Employed
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: own calculations.
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Figure 9: Women: Income (Censored)
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from




Table A.1: Sample Characteristics
Overall Males Females Heterosex.
Variable N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Demographic
Age (Wave 4) 2958 27.465 1.844 27.384 1.788 27.531 1.886 27.538 1.860
Female (%) 2958 0.548 0.498 0.465 0.499
Father’s Educ (Wave 1, %)
University 2958 0.153 0.361 0.153 0.360 0.154 0.361 0.148 0.355
3yr College 2958 0.090 0.286 0.092 0.289 0.088 0.283 0.086 0.281
Vocational 2958 0.138 0.345 0.134 0.341 0.141 0.348 0.141 0.349
Mother’s Educ (Wave 1, %)
University 2958 0.073 0.260 0.073 0.259 0.073 0.261 0.064 0.244
3yr College 2958 0.204 0.403 0.203 0.403 0.204 0.403 0.199 0.399
Vocational 2958 0.038 0.191 0.037 0.190 0.038 0.192 0.039 0.193
Household Composition (Wave 1)
Siblings 2958 1.720 1.095 1.694 1.094 1.742 1.096 1.727 1.062
Single Parent (%) 2958 0.124 0.330 0.128 0.334 0.121 0.326 0.116 0.320
Remarried (%) 2958 0.054 0.226 0.052 0.221 0.056 0.230 0.047 0.211
No Parents (%) 2958 0.046 0.210 0.040 0.195 0.052 0.222 0.045 0.207
Father’s SES (Wave 1, %)
High 2958 0.268 0.443 0.271 0.445 0.266 0.442 0.263 0.441
Skilled 2958 0.139 0.346 0.135 0.341 0.143 0.350 0.141 0.349
Mother’s SES (Wave 1, %)
High 2958 0.069 0.253 0.076 0.264 0.064 0.244 0.060 0.238
Skilled 2958 0.014 0.118 0.012 0.109 0.016 0.126 0.014 0.116
Scores (Wave 1)
Soc. Accept. 2892 0.000 0.720 -0.012 0.717 0.010 0.722 0.012 0.714
Sympathetic 2891 -0.001 0.731 -0.173 0.735 0.140 0.697 -0.014 0.737
Self-esteem 2893 0.000 0.733 0.142 0.722 -0.117 0.722 0.038 0.730
Leadership 2836 -0.002 0.581 0.034 0.599 -0.031 0.564 -0.007 0.572
Grades 2726 0.066 1.897 -0.145 1.923 0.241 1.857 0.096 1.931
Scholastic 2892 -0.001 0.673 0.066 0.677 -0.056 0.665 0.025 0.672
College & Labor Mkt (Wave 4, %)
Any College 2958 0.622 0.485 0.561 0.496 0.673 0.469 0.617 0.486
Active 2626 0.863 0.344 0.886 0.318 0.845 0.362 0.884 0.320
Employed 2626 0.816 0.387 0.829 0.377 0.807 0.395 0.841 0.366
Full Time 2626 0.626 0.484 0.757 0.429 0.524 0.500 0.661 0.474
Note: University (universitetet) includes program of four or more years. 3yr College corresponds to the høyskole. Remarried
takes the value of 1 if the person—at that time of wave 1—lived with a parent who remarried. High SES describes parents who
have a high administrative or academic job. Soc. Accept. (social acceptance), Sympathetic (capable of building close friendships),
Self-esteem, Leadership and Scholastic Competence are measures that come from SPPA scales (Harter, 1988). Grades correspond
to a demeaned aggregation of school grades (Math, Norwegian and English). The Any College variable takes the value of 1 when
the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). Employed presents
the proportion of people employed out of the whole sample, and not out of only those active. The same holds for Full Time.
Source: Own calculations. 56
B General Distribution of Skills: Income Gap Controlling
for Unobservables
In this appendix, I introduce the unobserved skills in a labor market outcome model similar to
those of the existing literature. The idea is to expand the reduced-form results to incorporate
unobserved heterogeneity. Hence the equation I estimate is
Y = α + γGay + βX + ψIMR + λθ + ε
E = αE + γEGay + βEX + λEθ + ε
where θ is the unobserved skills that are drawn from a general distribution estimated using the
complete sample. Like with the reduced-form results, I am interested in the estimates of γ and
γE. The results are presented in Table B.1 for each definition of homosexuality and each measure
of yearly income. These results are similar to the reduced-form results from the third column of
Table 2. They suggest that the greatest differences between heterosexuals’ and homosexuals’ job
market rewards are in terms of the access to a job rather than in the amount payed once they have
a job. Interestingly, once I control for skills, I find that, unlike homosexual males, lesbians face no
difference in the probability of being employed compared to their heterosexual counterparts.
Table B.1: Income Gap Controlling for Skills with Selection Equations
SI SP SX
Income Employed Income Employed Income Employed
IncomeEmpl
Gay -14.272 -0.623*** -24.379 -0.374*** -14.154 -0.231
(19.590) (0.130) (15.335) (0.130) (14.324) (0.142)
Gay× Female 9.963 0.431*** 17.429 0.236 5.909 0.060
(18.366) (0.155) (16.021) (0.159) (17.214) (0.182)
Obs.(N|Cnsrd) 2259 1806 2266 1814 2270 1814
IncomeFullTime4
Gay 4.083 -0.699*** -4.790 -0.526*** 9.011 -0.266**
(46.164) (0.124) (38.594) (0.123) (31.953) (0.134)
Gay× Female -46.725 0.768*** -30.537 0.520*** -52.915 0.367**
(52.697) (0.145) (43.168) (0.147) (43.874) (0.169)
Obs.(N|Cnsrd) 2368 1442 2374 1449 2378 1447
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The controls used in all the equation and not presented in the Table are: age, age
squared, gender, dummies for father’s education, whether as a child the person lived with one parent, a remarried parent
or with no parents. Constants not shown. Source: Own calculations.
57
C Models With Dichotomous Definitions of Homosexuality
C.1 Loadings of Latent Factors
Table C.1: Skill Loadings: Income and Employment (Heterosexuals), Roy Model
SI SP
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
College† 2.078*** (0.350) 1.992*** (0.341)
SI SP
Income Employed Income Employed
Employed
No College 35.540 0.043 29.974 0.483
(22.786) (0.329) (25.782) (0.325)
College 102.116*** 0.624* 76.439** 0.516
(32.114) (0.352) (31.290) (0.341)
Obs.(N|Cnsrd) 1746 1438 1825 1493
Note: See note in Table C.2. Source: Own calculations.
Table C.2: Skill Loadings: Income and Employment (Homosexuals), Roy Model
SI SP
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
College† 6.717 (4.905) 6.922 (5.268)
SI SP
Income Employed Income Employed
Employed
No College 124.351 5.537 105.036 -0.112
(255.394) (4.412) (91.294) (1.268)
College 300.241 0.502 428.380*** 0.952
(250.011) (2.686) (157.841) (1.798)
Obs.(N|Cnsrd) 518 373 446 326
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls used in the college choice equation are: age, age squared, gender,
municipality population, mother’s and father’s education, indicators of skipping school, taken out of classroom and police
contact while teenager. Controls in the selection equations are: age, age squared, gender, whether as a child the person
lived with both parents, indicator for practicing sports while teenager and male labor force participation rate in the 25
to 39 age bracket in the municipality. Controls in the income equations are: age, age squared, gender, father’s SES,
and mother’s education. The College variable takes the value of 1 when the person has undertaken any kind of tertiary
education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). This includes three-year, four-year college studies or studies
in the university with the same length. Source: Own calculations. †Coefficients, not marginal effects.
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C.2 Goodness-of-Fit
Table C.3: Goodness of Fit - Annual Income by Schooling level and Sexual Preference Definition
Roy Model, Heterosexuals Sample
College Employment Income
Means Means Std.Dev. Means Std.Dev.
SI
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.824 0.381 235.909 154.010
Model 0.821 0.383 235.954 155.524




Actual 0.863 0.344 242.878 142.006
Model 0.854 0.352 240.357 145.003
College
Actual 0.805 0.396 230.578 161.850
Model 0.793 0.405 226.475 163.426
SP
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.817 0.386 234.355 155.464
Model 0.815 0.388 234.145 156.276




Actual 0.864 0.343 242.863 143.266
Model 0.860 0.346 241.409 145.566
College
Actual 0.796 0.403 228.534 162.795
Model 0.789 0.408 226.563 163.909
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicate the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of the
model predictions being different to the actual moments provided by the data. The model predictions
are the result of 40,000 simulations of the estimated models. Source: Own calculations.
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Table C.4: Goodness of Fit - Annual Income by Schooling level and Sexual Preference Definition
Roy Model, Homosexuals Sample
College Employment Income
Means Means Std.Dev. Means Std.Dev.
SI
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.722 0.448 187.037 153.482
Model 0.705 0.456 183.454 154.725




Actual 0.771 0.421 197.709 153.842
Model 0.731 0.430 188.752 159.243
College
Actual 0.707 0.456 184.355 157.720
Model 0.694 0.460 177.723 157.386
SP
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.740 0.439 188.186 148.691
Model 0.723 0.447 184.378 150.918




Actual 0.788 0.410 204.260 148.560
Model 0.745 0.431 196.365 157.397
College
Actual 0.720 0.450 181.901 154.018
Model 0.694 0.458 167.424* 154.405
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicate the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of the
model predictions being different to the actual moments provided by the data. The model predictions
are the result of 40,000 simulations of the estimated models. Source: Own calculations.
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D Goodness-of-Fit of Models with Homosexuality as a Fac-
tor
Table D.1: Goodness of Fit - Annual Income by Schooling level
Overall Sample
College Employment Income
Means Means Std.Dev. Means Std.Dev.
Employed
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.804 0.397 223.187 156.443
Model 0.802 0.398 222.466 156.761




Actual 0.840 0.367 244.936 145.460
Model 0.840 0.366 244.512 145.625
College
Actual 0.771 0.420 223.312 161.473
Model 0.770 0.421 223.250 162.155
Full Time
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.608 0.488 181.083 174.761
Model 0.609 0.488 180.793 174.368




Actual 0.641 0.480 200.978 174.080
Model 0.645 0.478 202.051 174.308
College
Actual 0.573 0.495 176.562 177.097
Model 0.571 0.495 175.004 176.686
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicate the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
of the model predictions being different to the actual moments provided by the data. The model
predictions are the result of 40,000 simulations of the estimated models. Source: Own calculations.
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Table D.2: Goodness of Fit - Annual Income Gender Specific Models
Males
College Employment Income
Means Means Std.Dev. Means Std.Dev.
Employed
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.827 0.379 251.367 167.840
Model 0.823 0.381 249.887 168.638




Actual 0.882 0.323 287.180 149.636
Model 0.874 0.331 284.946 152.562
College
Actual 0.778 0.416 243.243 177.536
Model 0.767 0.422 237.917 178.456
Full Time
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.752 0.432 239.183 180.509
Model 0.750 0.433 238.542 181.420




Actual 0.831 0.375 278.003 164.301
Model 0.828 0.377 276.680 166.016
College
Actual 0.684 0.465 225.199 189.382
Model 0.682 0.465 224.043 189.293
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicate the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of the
model predictions being different to the actual moments provided by the data. The model predictions
are the result of 40,000 simulations of the estimated models. Source: Own calculations.
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Table D.3: Goodness of Fit - Annual Income Gender Specific Models
Females
College Employment Income
Means Means Std.Dev. Means Std.Dev.
Employed
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.787 0.410 200.971 143.040
Model 0.783 0.412 200.329 143.820




Actual 0.794 0.405 196.027 122.846
Model 0.791 0.406 195.460 123.727
College
Actual 0.769 0.421 211.830 149.295
Model 0.766 0.423 211.018 149.794
Full Time
1. Model Without Endogenous Education Choice
Actual 0.498 0.500 136.583 156.306
Model 0.499 0.500 135.705 155.606




Actual 0.438 0.497 118.913 143.839
Model 0.442 0.496 118.492 142.733
College
Actual 0.504 0.500 145.991 162.094
Model 0.504 0.500 145.257 161.768
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicate the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of the
model predictions being different to the actual moments provided by the data. The model predictions
are the result of 40,000 simulations of the estimated models. Source: Own calculations.
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E Estimates of Skill Distributions and Loadings
This appendix presents the details of the results of estimating model (3) to identify the skill factors
in different subsamples. Namely, the whole sample and homosexual and heterosexual subsamples
according to the SI and the SP definitions. The estimations on the whole sample are the ones
that allow the results presented in Section 5.1. The estimations on the sexual-preference-specific
subsamples according to each definition relate to the results presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
E.1 Whole Sample












−2 −1 0 1
Skills
Note: Estimated from measurement systems presented in Table E.1. Estimations
use the mixing of two normals. Distributional parameter are the following: µ1 =
0.555, σ1 = 0.393, µ2 = −3.264, σ2 = 0.030, and the mixing probability is 0.058.
Author’s calculations.
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Table E.1: Skills Measurement System Estimation (Whole Sample)
Soc. Accept. Sympathetic Self-esteem Leadership Grades Scholastic
Female 0.007 0.309*** -0.267*** -0.066*** 0.339*** -0.136***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.069) (0.026)
Age 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.005 0.033*** 0.178*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.019) (0.007)
Father: Univ 0.048 0.047 0.083* 0.107*** 0.793*** 0.216***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.113) (0.042)
Father: 3yrColl 0.029 0.071 0.017 0.063 0.922*** 0.227***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.039) (0.123) (0.045)
Father: Vocat 0.023 0.063 -0.044 0.100*** 0.129 0.025
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.033) (0.102) (0.038)
Mother: Univ 0.036 0.040 0.017 0.035 0.296** 0.094*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.048) (0.148) (0.055)
Num. Siblings -0.014 -0.012 -0.006 -0.024** -0.015 -0.020*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.032) (0.012)
LivesBothParents 0.081** -0.012 0.107*** -0.028 0.413*** 0.109***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) (0.085) (0.031)
Father: HighSES 0.001 -0.019 0.032 0.053* 0.512*** 0.090***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) (0.085) (0.031)
Mother: HighSES 0.097* 0.117** 0.060 0.107** 0.079 0.119**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.142) (0.052)
Constant -0.659*** -0.657*** -0.021 -0.453*** -3.454*** 0.336***
(0.128) (0.126) (0.127) (0.101) (0.312) (0.116)
Skills 1.865*** 1.367*** 1.419*** 0.742*** 0.774*** 1
(0.113) (0.084) (0.075) (0.050) (0.131) .
Note: Univ (universitetet) includes program of four or more years. 3yrColl corresponds to the høyskole. High SES describes parents
who have a high administrative or academic job. Soc. Accept. (social acceptance), Sympathetic (capable of building close friendships),
Self-esteem, Leadership and Scholastic Competence are measures that come from SPPA scales (Harter, 1988). Grades correspond to
a demeaned aggregation of school grades (Math, Norwegian and English). Observations: 2,595. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations.
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E.2 By Sexual Preference
Table E.2: Skills Measurement System Estimation (Homosexual SI)
Soc. Accept. Sympathetic Self-esteem Leadership Grades Scholastic
Female 0.119** 0.230*** -0.156** -0.108* 0.244 -0.171***
(0.050) (0.065) (0.068) (0.056) (0.163) (0.062)
Age 0.005 0.015 -0.018 0.020 0.149*** -0.035**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.038) (0.015)
Father: Univ 0.009 -0.013 0.066 0.187*** 0.634*** 0.270***
(0.061) (0.084) (0.088) (0.072) (0.212) (0.081)
Father: 3yrColl 0.095* 0.131 0.078 0.047 0.786*** 0.170*
(0.054) (0.088) (0.093) (0.077) (0.228) (0.087)
Father: Vocat 0.119* 0.157* -0.122 0.206*** 0.017 -0.022
(0.069) (0.083) (0.085) (0.070) (0.202) (0.078)
Mother: Univ -0.018 -0.110 -0.005 0.178** 0.241 0.023
(0.052) (0.101) (0.109) (0.090) (0.268) (0.102)
Num. Siblings -0.036*** -0.045* -0.006 -0.024 -0.032 -0.016
(0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.060) (0.023)
LivesBothParents -0.095** -0.178*** 0.019 -0.148*** 0.658*** 0.106*
(0.037) (0.061) (0.065) (0.054) (0.160) (0.061)
Father: HighSES 0.024 0.069 0.074 -0.015 0.366** 0.083
(0.043) (0.064) (0.068) (0.056) (0.165) (0.063)
Mother: HighSES 0.013 0.098 0.074 -0.048 0.189 0.086
(0.061) (0.098) (0.103) (0.086) (0.253) (0.096)
Constant -0.098 -0.207 0.248 -0.111 -2.902*** 0.532**
(0.140) (0.236) (0.252) (0.209) (0.617) (0.235)
Skills 4.541*** 2.549*** 1.729*** 1.036*** -0.243 1
(0.824) (0.494) (0.364) (0.244) (0.481) .
Note: Univ (universitetet) includes program of four or more years. 3yrColl corresponds to the høyskole. High SES describes parents
who have a high administrative or academic job. Soc. Accept. (social acceptance), Sympathetic (capable of building close friendships),
Self-esteem, Leadership and Scholastic Competence are measures that come from SPPA scales (Harter, 1988). Grades correspond to
a demeaned aggregation of school grades (Math, Norwegian and English). Observations: 568. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations.
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Table E.3: Skills Measurement System Estimation (Heterosexual SI)
Soc. Accept. Sympathetic Self-esteem Leadership Grades Scholastic
Female -0.006 0.324*** -0.274*** -0.066*** 0.322*** -0.144***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.080) (0.029)
Age 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.011 0.038*** 0.191*** -0.024***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.023) (0.008)
Father: Univ 0.057 0.049 0.100* 0.082* 0.825*** 0.197***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.042) (0.134) (0.048)
Father: 3yrColl 0.047 0.081 0.024 0.076* 0.978*** 0.271***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.147) (0.053)
Father: Vocat 0.009 0.037 -0.010 0.064* 0.159 0.044
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.037) (0.119) (0.043)
Mother: Univ 0.055 0.102 0.015 -0.013 0.316* 0.106*
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.055) (0.177) (0.064)
Num. Siblings -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.023* -0.007 -0.026*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.038) (0.014)
LivesBothParents 0.118*** 0.026 0.121*** 0.015 0.332*** 0.102***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.101) (0.037)
Father: HighSES -0.004 -0.030 0.017 0.073** 0.577*** 0.095***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.031) (0.100) (0.036)
Mother: HighSES 0.118* 0.110* 0.060 0.145*** 0.024 0.129**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.054) (0.171) (0.062)
Constant -0.781*** -0.750*** -0.101 -0.575*** -3.651*** 0.303**
(0.146) (0.144) (0.145) (0.115) (0.365) (0.133)
Skills 1.667*** 1.238*** 1.373*** 0.686*** 0.902*** 1
(0.099) (0.078) (0.074) (0.049) (0.136) .
Note: Univ (universitetet) includes program of four or more years. 3yrColl corresponds to the høyskole. High SES describes parents
who have a high administrative or academic job. Soc. Accept. (social acceptance), Sympathetic (capable of building close friendships),
Self-esteem, Leadership and Scholastic Competence are measures that come from SPPA scales (Harter, 1988). Grades correspond to
a demeaned aggregation of school grades (Math, Norwegian and English). Observations: 2,001. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations.
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Table E.4: Skills Measurement System Estimation (Homosexual SP)
Soc. Accept. Sympathetic Self-esteem Leadership Grades Scholastic
Female 0.132* 0.353*** -0.099 -0.053 0.126 -0.144**
(0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.059) (0.164) (0.065)
Age 0.009 -0.003 -0.050*** 0.005 0.162*** -0.048***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.043) (0.017)
Father: Univ 0.025 0.011 0.169 0.266*** 0.323 0.358***
(0.112) (0.109) (0.106) (0.090) (0.250) (0.099)
Father: 3yrColl 0.040 0.094 0.053 0.131 0.656** 0.144
(0.116) (0.113) (0.111) (0.095) (0.265) (0.104)
Father: Vocat 0.160 0.211** 0.036 0.222*** 0.027 0.016
(0.104) (0.101) (0.097) (0.082) (0.225) (0.089)
Mother: Univ 0.084 -0.064 0.147 0.125 0.477 0.038
(0.126) (0.125) (0.123) (0.106) (0.295) (0.116)
Num. Siblings 0.009 -0.022 0.026 -0.035 -0.005 0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.060) (0.023)
LivesBothParents -0.006 -0.076 0.047 -0.139** 0.803*** 0.267***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.060) (0.167) (0.065)
Father: HighSES -0.010 0.039 -0.080 -0.042 0.450** 0.024
(0.090) (0.087) (0.084) (0.071) (0.195) (0.077)
Mother: HighSES 0.239** 0.187 0.133 0.062 0.256 0.082
(0.120) (0.117) (0.114) (0.097) (0.269) (0.106)
Constant -0.377 -0.207 0.583** 0.020 -3.430*** 0.459*
(0.299) (0.291) (0.284) (0.244) (0.677) (0.266)
Skills 2.777*** 2.198*** 1.762*** 0.890*** 0.448 1
(0.449) (0.359) (0.281) (0.173) (0.373) .
Note: Univ (universitetet) includes program of four or more years. 3yrColl corresponds to the høyskole. High SES describes parents
who have a high administrative or academic job. Soc. Accept. (social acceptance), Sympathetic (capable of building close friendships),
Self-esteem, Leadership and Scholastic Competence are measures that come from SPPA scales (Harter, 1988). Grades correspond to
a demeaned aggregation of school grades (Math, Norwegian and English). Observations: 507. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations.
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Table E.5: Skills Measurement System Estimation (Heterosexual SP)
Soc. Accept. Sympathetic Self-esteem Leadership Grades Scholastic
Female 0.000 0.311*** -0.286*** -0.067*** 0.409*** -0.129***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.078) (0.028)
Age 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.018** 0.039*** 0.178*** -0.022***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.022) (0.008)
Father: Univ 0.064 0.047 0.081 0.078** 0.890*** 0.192***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.040) (0.127) (0.046)
Father: 3yrColl 0.040 0.069 0.023 0.049 0.986*** 0.266***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.043) (0.138) (0.050)
Father: Vocat 0.003 0.034 -0.054 0.071** 0.153 0.043
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.114) (0.041)
Mother: Univ 0.029 0.086 -0.014 0.011 0.270 0.104*
(0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.053) (0.170) (0.062)
Num. Siblings -0.023 -0.008 -0.020 -0.021* -0.013 -0.031**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.038) (0.014)
LivesBothParents 0.112*** 0.009 0.127*** 0.010 0.290*** 0.060*
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.031) (0.098) (0.036)
Father: HighSES -0.007 -0.027 0.045 0.067** 0.528*** 0.103***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.030) (0.095) (0.035)
Mother: HighSES 0.087 0.118* 0.073 0.126** 0.020 0.143**
(0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.052) (0.165) (0.060)
Constant -0.732*** -0.759*** -0.187 -0.579*** -3.380*** 0.331**
(0.138) (0.139) (0.141) (0.111) (0.352) (0.129)
Skills 1.688*** 1.235*** 1.351*** 0.713*** 0.821*** 1
(0.105) (0.081) (0.075) (0.051) (0.138) .
Note: Univ (universitetet) includes program of four or more years. 3yrColl corresponds to the høyskole. High SES describes parents
who have a high administrative or academic job. Soc. Accept. (social acceptance), Sympathetic (capable of building close friendships),
Self-esteem, Leadership and Scholastic Competence are measures that come from SPPA scales (Harter, 1988). Grades correspond to
a demeaned aggregation of school grades (Math, Norwegian and English). Observations: 2,066. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations.
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F Additional Simulations of the Models with Homosexuality
Factor




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantile




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantile































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantile

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantile
Exp. Outcome 95% CI
Full Time
Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: Own calculations.
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Figure F.2: Income (Censored)
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: Own calculations.
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Figure F.3: Women: Probability of Being Employed
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: Own calculations.
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Figure F.4: Women: Income (Censored)
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: Own calculations.
Figure F.5: Men: Probability of Being Employed
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: Own calculations.
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Figure F.6: Men: Income (Censored)
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Note: Simulated incomes and employment probabilities using the estimated parameters and 40,000 draws from
each dimension of unobserved heterogeneity. Source: Own calculations.
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G Additional Tables and Graphs
Table G.1: Gap in College Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defini. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
SI 0.068*** (0.025) 0.032 (0.025) 0.041 (0.048) 0.024 (0.048)
SI×female -0.013 (0.056) 0.001 (0.056)
SP -0.008 (0.026) -0.028 (0.026) 0.039 (0.046) 0.023 (0.046)
SP×female -0.099* (0.055) -0.051 (0.055)
SX -0.016 (0.032) -0.016 (0.031) 0.067 (0.049) 0.072 (0.049)
SX×female -0.137** (0.063) -0.139** (0.063)
Age & gender X X X
Test Scores X
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The College variable takes the value of 1 when the
person has undertaken any kind of tertiary education in colleges (høyskole) or universities (universitetet). This includes three-
year, four-year college studies or studies in the university with the same length. Age enters in a quadratic polynomial. The
estimations with test scores include six scores, one related to school grades (Math, Norwegian and English), two of them relate
to agreeableness and the ease to make friends, the others relate to positivism, leadership and scholastic competence. All of them
collected in the first wave of the survey. Sample comprises the economically active by wave 4 to be comparable to structural
model results. Source: Own calculations.
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Table G.2: Homosexuality, Education and Labor Market Choices
Active Employed Full Time White Collar Has ISCO
Complete Sample
Latent Homosex. -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.027 -0.011 0.001
(0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019)
Latent Skills 0.318** 0.427*** 0.379*** 0.914*** 0.063
(0.140) (0.131) (0.119) (0.142) (0.125)
Obs. 2417 2417 2417 1900 2687
Males
Latent Homosex. -0.079*** -0.068*** -0.084***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.019)
Latent Skills 0.141 0.295 0.360**
(0.207) (0.183) (0.172)
Obs. 1027 1047 1047
Females
Latent Homosex. -0.043* -0.046* 0.036*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.022)
Latent Skills 0.358** 0.485*** 0.343**
(0.176) (0.168) (0.152)
Obs. 1370 1370 1370
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The controls used in all the equation and not presented in the Table are: age, age
squared, gender, dummies for father’s education, whether as a child the person lived with one parent, a remarried parent
or with no parents. Standard error in parentheses. Source: Own calculations.
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